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ABSTRACT
This paper provides an economic model resulting in two distinct marketing strategies available to investment
bankers. First, we hypothesize that an increased selling effort by brokers is used most effectively when the
investment clientele is uninformed. Second, adjusting the offer price of the issue is hypothesized to be employed
primarily in large IPOs with a clientele of sophisticated investors, consistent with Shiller’s Impresario
Hypothesis. Our pre-IPO bubble (1981-1996) empirical results yield evidence supporting both selling
mechanisms. Under-demanded small IPO issues are ‘pushed’ by the brokers, while some under-demanded large
IPO issues instead increase the offer price, with large first-day turnover characteristics of flipping. Both types
of issues experience large and significant negative long-term returns, as share prices eventually return to the
equilibrium price. For the post-IPO bubble period (1997-2017), the Impresario Hypothesis is empirically
supported, but the push strategy is not, indicating a partial shift in selling mechanisms post bubble.
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I. Introduction and Literature Review
This paper contributes to our understanding of why buyers of assets would sometimes pay
too much, well in excess of the assets’ eventual worth, i.e., irrational exuberance. The pricing of IPOs
seems to be fertile ground for such a study, as it is commonly known that investors in general pay too
much for IPO shares at the offer, or at the end of first day, in comparison to their eventual long-term
equilibrium prices.
In this study we uncover evidence that supports two plausible explanations on how such
demand could be created. An important implication of both explanations is that they show that some
markets may still exist even when certain key components, such as the presence of rational and
informed buyers, and reasonable information costs concerning the quality or value of an asset, are
absent. One explanation applies to small markets, such as that for small IPO issues. Here, the buyers
are almost exclusively small investors as it is prohibitively expensive for sophisticated investors to
acquire information, relative to the amount that these investors can invest (Benson, Brau, Cicon, and
Ferris, 2015). We show that an effective mechanism to create excess short-term demand is to provide
greater incentives to the selling agents, such as the stockbrokers, to ‘push’ the shares to the
unsophisticated small investors. Since the demand these shares are dictated by the selling agents to the
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unwary, in the market parlance, these shares are ‘sold’ to the uninformed investors, and not ‘bought’
by them (Ang and Brau, 2003).
In the second explanation, we are also able to show, among large IPOs, underwriters can
induce sophisticated and informed large investors to rationally participate in overpriced IPOs.
Informed investors need not be long-term investors. They may rationally decide to subscribe or take
up their normal allocation of IPO shares at the offer price (Jenkinson, Jones, and Suntheim, 2018),
even if they are aware of overpricing, as long as the expectation of being able to sell for a quick profit
shortly after issue is high, i.e., a practice commonly known as flipping (Krigman, Shaw and Womack,
1999; Brau, Li, and Shi, 2007).
In prior literature, much work has been conducted to investigate the market performance of
IPOs. This aftermarket performance has been divided into two primary areas of study -- the initial
price performance (i.e., known most commonly in the literature as underpricing, Brau, Cicon, and
McQueen, 2016) and the long-run performance of IPOs. Both the initial and long-run IPO
performance literature is filled with theories pertaining to why we observe the various return patterns
of IPOs (Brau and Fawcett, 2006). One area that has not yet been thoroughly analyzed in this line of
literature is the marketing of IPOs, including an analysis of clienteles’ specific marketing mechanisms,
and their consequences on short and long-term market prices.
In a firmly underwritten IPO, the underwriter is compensated by buying the securities at a
discount from the final offer price (Ang and Brau, 2002). This discount is termed the gross spread and
for typical issues is usually 7% (Uttal (1986), Smith and Dwyer (1998) and Chen and Ritter (2000)).
This spread is divided into the underwriter fee, the management fee, and the selling commission.
Typically, 20% of the gross spread is allocated to the underwriting syndicate, 20% to the managing
underwriter, and 60% as a selling concession allotted to underwriters based upon the portion of the
IPO sold (Bialkin and Grant (1985)).
Within the selling concession portion, brokers and dealers who are employed to sell shares of
the IPO to investors receive a portion known as the reallowance fee. Unlike the mostly fixed
underwriting, management, and selling concessions, we document considerable variability in the
reallowance fees given to the selling brokers as incentive to market the issues. Our empirical analysis
consists of two sample periods: the pre-IPO bubble (1981-1996) when access to information and
IPOs were a boom, and a post-IPO bubble sample (1997-2017).
We test the ‘push’ created demand hypothesis that artificial excess demand could be induced by
the effort of the selling agent. Specifically, we examine the empirical predictions that, for small IPOs,
more intense selling efforts cause: (i) higher initial first day price but (ii) that are completely offset by
losses in subsequent long-term market performance of the IPOs.
The marketing literature documents that different selling mechanisms are more effective
depending on the clientele. Within the IPO markets, the two major groups of clienteles are institutional
investors (i.e., sophisticated) and retail (i.e., individual or non-sophisticated). It is reasonable to expect
retail investors, being not as sophisticated as institutional investors, are more likely to be swayed by
the selling efforts of brokers and dealers (Chemmanur, Hu, Huang, 2010; Gibbs, 2018; Baxamusa and
Jalal, 2018).
It follows that issuers and their investment bankers may choose to depend more heavily upon
dealers and brokers to sell IPOs to their retail clientele. Thus, it is predicted that IPOs dominated by
retail investors (i.e., very small IPOs) will rely more on selling effort via reallowance incentive. In
particular, retail brokers and dealers will be employed most frequently when an IPO is underdemanded. (If the IPO has a strong initial demand then there is no need for investment banks to give
dealers and brokers a larger piece of the pie.) That is, these issues will be “pushed” by the brokers. As
such, those small IPOs that must be pushed into the market will on average be inferior IPOs. If dealers
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and brokers are effective in their selling effort, however, they can cause inferior IPOs to be in
temporary artificial high demand, as reflected in high initial returns. Ultimately over time however, the
true worth of these IPOs will be revealed and they will perform poorly over the long run.
When analyzing small firms in the pre-IPO bubble sample, we find that the results confirm
these predictions. A portfolio of the smallest IPOs that are in the top third of reallowance experience
nearly a 44% first day return followed by a -33% three-year return. If a compounded return is
calculated, the result from the offer price to the end of the third year is a net loss of –3.5%. In other
words, retail investors who managed to obtain an allocation at the offer price still overpaid by 3.5%
on the average. However, retail investors who bought the shares after offer, fare even worse, they
overpaid 48% on the average in the first day. It does appear that selling brokers are able to temporarily
mislead some unsophisticated small investors to buy inferior issues. In contrast, small issues that are
not pushed into the market do not fare as poorly, they under perform a characteristic matched control
sample by only 3% (versus –33% reported above) over a three-year holding period. (i.e., The first day
closing value of 1 share is 1*(1+0.44) = 1.44. The subsequent 33% decrease in value results in the
value of 1 share of 1.44*(1-0.33) = 0.965. Thus, the stock has decreased in value by 3.5 percent.)
Institutional investors, whose demand makes up the lion’s share of initial allocation for IPOs,
are not expected to be influenced by the high-pressure selling tactics of dealers and brokers. However,
they would knowingly subscribe to overpriced issues only if they could realize a quick profit. Thus, it
would be rational for the large investors to take up their allocation, if their participation could help
create an appearance of excess demand which in turn raises the expected profit from flipping
(Krigman, et al., 1999). This explanation is related to the Impresario Hypothesis for IPO pricing
proposed by Shiller (1990). Shiller suggests an intentional pre-offer underpricing, and a subsequent
offer price increase could generate excitement for the IPOs, thus, resulting in further first day price
increase. We refine the Impresario Hypothesis by incorporating flipping as a necessary condition and
show that it could be supported by rational large investors.
In this paper we document evidence in support of this variant of the Impresario Hypothesis
for both the pre- and post-IPO boom samples. First, we find large IPOs are more likely than small
IPOs to increase offer prices. The finding is consistent with the prediction of the Impresario
Hypothesis, in which an initial low offer price is increased to cause the unsophisticated small investors
to believe that demand for the share is unusually high. Large, institutional investors rationally accept
their normal allotment of shares, as they expect to profit from higher post offer market prices, partly
due to their action that helped create the high-perceived demand. The rationale of these large investors
is similar to the classic “Beauty Contest” of Keynes (1936). Specifically, sophisticated investors with
allocations buy shares based on what they perceive unsophisticated investors will currently pay for the
shares. Thus, in Keynesian terminology, sophisticated investors judge not what they perceive to be
the eventual winning IPOs, but they judge what they feel others (small investors) will judge, taking
into account their actions to subscribe, as the immediate winning IPOs. This conjecture is rational if
large investors expect to take short-term profit or flip.
We also provide supporting empirical evidence for the hypothesis’ two related predictions:
that large IPOs with the largest pre-offer price increases are associated with high first day initial returns
and subsequently experience the worst long-run performance. For the portfolio consisting of the
largest IPOs and the highest price adjustments (i.e., increased offer prices), the one-day return is nearly
14% whereas the three-year abnormal return is -18% based upon characteristic matched benchmarks,
resulting in a net return of –7%. These are clearly overpriced IPOs, even at the hard to get subscription
offer price, issued mostly to large investors. Nevertheless, it provides evidence that overpriced or
inferior IPOs are bought by the large investors, as they could realize a one day flipping profit of 14%
on the average. Our empirical result questions the partial adjustment interpretation of IPO prices at
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offer by Hanley (1993), which do not take into account of the fact that large investors can and do flip
for short-term profit. Interestingly, we only find empirical support for the Impresario Hypothesis as
a relevant factor for the post-IPO bubble sample.
The remainder of this paper is as follows. In Section 2, the theoretical underpinnings for the
study are outlined. Section 3 discusses the sample selection and sample characteristics. Section 4
documents IPO selling efforts and its relationship with initial and long run performance. In Section
5, IPO offer price adjustments are discussed as a possible marketing technique. In Section 6, regression
models are estimated to determine the impact of offer price adjustments and selling effort on shortand long-term prices, while controlling for other relevant variables. Section 7 summarizes and
concludes.
II. Theoretical Development
In this section, we develop the theoretical framework for the two mechanisms in which an
artificially high demand for capital asset could be created, in which buyers paying way too much could
be observed. The foundations underlying the mechanisms are first described, and a more formal
treatment is given later.
A. Background and Assumptions
Let there be two types of investors. Informed investors are defined as sophisticated investors
who pay to acquire information pertaining to the IPO firm. In this paper we refer to this type of
investor interchangeably as informed, sophisticated, or institutional. Although informed investors pay
to be well informed, they are not perfectly informed. They know their own estimate for the value of
the issue with certainty; however, they do not know the demand of all other investors. In contrast to
informed investors, uninformed, unsophisticated, or retail investors are less capable to acquire or
utilize information which is due to their lack of time, resources, analytical ability, and the high cost of
information relative to the size of their investments. Thus, they are more likely to depend upon third
parties such as brokers and dealers for information.
Defining these two types of investors allows us to identify the clienteles associated with two
IPO markets based on the size of the issue. Large issues are those IPOs that attract the attention of
both large and small investors. Small issues are those that attract mainly (if not exclusively) small retail
investors. Large investors would not participate in issues of small IPOs, as it is too costly for them to
acquire the necessary information about small IPOs relative to the dollar size of purchase they can
reasonably make. Since it must necessarily follow that the acquisition and analysis of relevant
information on the small issues by non-sophisticated investors should be even more expensive, thus,
small IPOs may not have a market if all small investors were to acquire the same high-quality
information demanded by the sophisticated.
B. The ‘Push’ created demand hypothesis
Small investors cannot afford the resources to acquire information about shares. They are also
less likely to invest in human capital to become sophisticated. Thus, many small investors, realizing
they are uninformed and unsophisticated, do not invest directly. Some, however, miscalculate their
ability to acquire and process information. Instead, they rely too much on low cost but unreliable
sources of information, such as broker’s supplied news. Consequently, these investors form
expectations of share prices that are based on noisy, possibly biased, if not outright misleading
information. The seller’s agents, who are usually the supplier of these information, have to expend
marketing resources. The less likely some manufactured news is to be believed, in which fewer persons
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are expected to buy the story, then the more the efforts are needed to ‘push’ the shares to the unwary.
The specific forms of effort costs that are increasing with the unreliability of information are: (i)
making more cold calls by the brokers, (ii) mobilizing more salespersons, and (iii) taking more time to
convince each client. Higher marketing efforts, or ‘push’ should cause the selling brokers to demand
greater compensation. Thus, our testable hypothesis in the case of a ‘push’ created demand is that the
more an issue is overpriced, the greater is the selling effort needed. Observationally, a direct correlation
between the overpricing of the issue is predicted. A related prediction is that since issues that must be
‘pushed’ into the market are overpriced, their market prices will eventually suffer large long-term
losses.
The necessary condition for this type of market to exist is the lack of informed investors who
could have defeated, e.g., by selling short, the push generated artificial excess demand. Thus, the
hypothesis is applicable only to small IPOs, shunned by large investors due to high information
acquisition costs relative to the dollar size of their investments.
C. The Impresario Hypothesis
Recall the two types of investors. The large and sophisticated who may choose to be
informed at a cost, and the small and unsophisticated who cannot afford to pay for information, nor
are capable of processing it. The latter would base their expectations partly on their perceived
aggregate demand for shares. Having not invested in information, these small, unsophisticated
investors could form their perception of the pre-offer aggregate demand by other investors for an
IPO to be based on observable external indicators. These indicators may take the form of observing:
1) pre-offer price adjustment made by the underwriter, upward or downward, in the offering price, 2)
the proportion of shares ‘take up’ by the large, institutional investors, and 3) other scarcity indicators,
including their own experience in attempting to get an allocation at the IPO offer price.
The sophisticated are aware of how the uninformed form expectations of aggregate demand.
They also understand that any attempt by the underwriters or issuers to create the appearance of
excess demand could produce a cascade like effect on the uninformed, causing the market price to be
further away from equilibrium price. These expectations of the sophisticated along with the fact that
they can: 1) receive allocation of IPO shares at the offering price, and 2) be able to quickly resale to
the uninformed at a higher price due to a first day run-up by the uninformed, make them willing to
buy shares at any price-- below, at, or higher than their long run prices. After all, it is a wealth
maximizing rational behavior.
The scenario outlined is best described by the Impresario hypothesis. To verify the
hypothesis, we examine its testable implications: (1) the initial offering price of IPO may be set below
its long run equilibrium price, (2) the offering price adjustment affects the first day price change, i.e.,
the cascade effect that arises from a perception of excess demand is proportional to the extent of
offering price adjustment; and (3) all price adjustments result in overpriced or positive deviations from
equilibrium prices. They are expected to reverse, eventually, if not soon.
A weaker form of the hypothesis is that the offering price needs not be less than its true
equilibrium prices. That is, instead of riskless arbitrage by the sophisticated when they purchase IPOs
at below equilibrium prices, they are willing to take some risks with the expectation that they can resale
or flip at a profit. Here, the extent of first day underpricing, and long-term overpricing, is a function
of the size of offer price adjustment, and not whether the initial offering price is below its equilibrium
price.
To recapitulate how mispricing can occur in a market with many large and informed investors
consider the following. First, underwriters generally underprice an IPO, for various reasons, such as
risk aversion, or to bribe the informed to reveal their true demand (e.g., Tinic (1988) and Benveniste
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and Spindt (1989)). This behavior is consistent with the following rank order of the underwriters’
objectives: their own interests come first, then those of their long-time institutional investors, the
infrequent issuers are next, and retail investors of other brokers rank last. Second, when underwriters
of large IPO issues discover the aggregate demand from their book building activities, they have at
least two strategic options.
First, for IPO issues in high demand, they can either stand pat, or raise the offering price.
Second, for IPO issues found to be in low demand, they can choose to lower the offering price and/or
shift their focus from the institutional to retail investors by increasing the marketing effort. Or, they
can convince the institutional investors to participate, with an implicit promise that they can realize
immediate profits from flipping. The participation of the institutional investors along with an increase
in offering price could cause the uninformed retail investors to infer a condition of scarcity from high
demand by the informed.
In either situation, increasing offering price will benefit the first three groups at the expense of
the retail investors. Issuers receive higher cash proceeds from IPOs, institutional investors can realize
quick profits from flipping, and the lead underwriters keep their main constituencies happy, with
expectations of more future dealings. However, for a strategy of creating higher perceived demand to
work, causing short term over pricing, and thus, profitability in flipping, the underwriters would have
to pursue a mixed offering strategy in which the market observes instances of low demand issues
experiencing offer price decreases, and observes no change in offering prices for high demand issues.
As a consequence of the mixed strategy, the retail investors may be rendered less able to discern an
issue’s true demand when offer price is increased.
D. A Formal Model
In this section, we formally model the two hypotheses discussed above. Consider a multiperiod model. Time 0 is the issuance date (where time –1, is the pre-offer date); Time 1 is a short
period after IPO, it could be as short as a day, or minutes after offer; and Time 2 is a longer period
horizon, such as one, two, or three years later.
Let there be two types of investors. Type L investors manage large portfolios, are
sophisticated, capable of spending for information and analysis if needed, and have long term trading
and other relationships with the underwriters. Type S investors are small, may not have the
sophistication, analytical skills, funds to acquire information, and do not generate large trading
commissions for the underwriters.
The objectives of both types of investors are identical: maximize expected returns from
investing. To complete the analysis, we include first, the issuers whose objectives are, in order: (1)
issue success, or raise the money through the IPO, and realize whatever benefits from going public;
(2) maximize funds raised per one percent equity sold to outsiders, i.e., minimize dilution to insiders
as the dual problem to (1) under constraints; and (3) raise the chance of success in issuing future
securities. Secondly, we include the underwriters whose objectives are, in order: (1) to maximize their
own profit from the current issue, i.e., ensuring issue success to collect underwriting fees and credit
to gain future issues; (2) to benefit frequent clients, Type L; (3) to benefit the infrequent client, the
issuer; and last, and least, (4) to benefit the retail investors, Type S, who may not even be the
underwriter’s direct clients, as they may be low transaction dollar clients from the designated selling
group.
At Time –1, the underwriter, working with the issuer, makes a tentative pre-offer price, V(-1),
or price range. Between Time –1 to offer date Time 0, the underwriters collect information on the
demand schedule, i.e., aggregate shares demanded by L at prices in the neighborhood of V(-1), and
decide the offer price, V(0). The information is useful but noisy.
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As a basis for later comparison, we start with a simple IPO allocation model in which only L
type are allocated the IPO shares. Thus, the demand schedules the underwriter obtains is that of the
L type. Depending on the expected demand, the underwriter may raise, hold, or lower the pre-offer
price. Given that the underwriter deals only with L type, there are two considerations in pricing. First,
since only L type receive all initial allocation, the offer price must be set less than or at most equal to
its equilibrium price at Time 2 as expected by Type L, V(2,L):
(1)

𝑉(0) ≤ 𝑉 (2, 𝐿).

Second, to induce the L types to reveal their true demand, the offer price may have to be set less than
V(2,L), as in Benveniste and Spindt (1989):
(2)

𝑉(0) < 𝑉(2, 𝐿).

Note that since only L type can receive allocation, either (1) or (2) must hold, strictly or else, no shares
can be sold. If (1) or (2) is not satisfied, V(0) may either be decreased to satisfy (1) or (2), or the issue
can be withdrawn.
To model the practice of short-term profit taking or flipping, we allow L type to sell shares in
Time 1 (recall time 1 is as short as the first day, or the first few minutes). Next, we relax the assumption
that only L type can subscribe. Instead of receiving 100% of shares, L type will receive the majority
of shares at the offer, say from 60 to 80%, which is more realistic. The rest is to be allocated to S type
to be based on the retail-selling brokers’ allocation rule.
Recall L type investors are capable of spending money to gather information and to perform
analysis on the issue. Specifically, let c be the expected information costs for each L type investor.
Then a risk neutral L type will invest only if its expected value at time 2 exceeds its purchase price at
the offer, and the information acquisition costs.
𝐴𝑖 𝑉(0) + 𝑐 < 𝐴𝑖 𝑉(2, 𝐿𝑖 ),

(3)

where Ai, is the number of shares allocated to Type L investor i. The product A i x V(0) is the dollar
allocation to investor i. Thus, Type L will either demand, or not take up its allocation, of an offer price
satisfying Equation (3). Equation (3) may be rearranged as,
𝑐

𝑉 ′ (0) < 𝑉(2, 𝐿𝑖 ) − (𝐴 ),
𝑖

(4)

V’(0) is the highest offer price above type L will pay for IPO shares, taking into account of information
costs. Alternatively, it will not invest in information acquisition unless it gets a dollar allocation at least
equal to Ai V(0) in (3) , or Ai to exceed.
𝑐

𝐴𝑖 > 𝑉(2,𝐿 )−𝑉(0).
𝑖

(5)

The importance of AiV(0) is that it establishes a minimum threshold of dollar allocation Type
L must have, before it will spend money to acquire information. Conversely, if they do not acquire
information, they will also not purchase shares. Hence, there is the case of the IPO being too small
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for type L, i.e., below Ai or AiV(0). For convenience, we shall call issues with size below this threshold
small IPOs, and those above the threshold as large IPOs.
Now consider Type S, if they were to acquire the same information and to perform the same
analysis as those of Type L, they would have to incur a higher cost, C > c, than L, as they are less
efficient and capable. Since each Type S is expected to receive a much smaller allocation, aj << Ai, and
with higher costs to be informed, C > c, they would have to be able to subscribe at a much lower offer
price than that paid by L type, as determined in Equation (4) above, which is clearly not possible, or,
in accord with most practice.
Thus, Type S may: (a) not invest; (b) invest only indirectly, such as organizing many small Ss,
into a Type L, as in a mutual fund; or c) do not follow L in information acquisition, but rather use less
expensive but also less reliable sources of information. This information may be classified to come
from two sources, both may be assigned a marginal cost of zero for the present analysis, C=0. The
first is from unreliable third parties, with and without agency conflicts, such as brokers, heard on
market rumors, internet chat room discussions, etc., The second are certain indicator variables in
which the S type use to infer L type’s demand for the shares. We shall designate these two sources of
information as noise/rumors and indicator/signal. Here, S type may be regarded as feedback traders,
whose trades depend on their inference concerning the trades taken by Type L. One such indicator is
the change in pre-offer price to final offer price, in which they may infer an increase to signify high
and unsatisfied demand by L type, and vice versa for price decreases. Another indicator is the percent
of allocation ‘take-up’ by the L type.
Next, we solve for the strategies to be chosen by the underwriter and Type L investors. We
shall limit our attention to the more interesting case of lower than expected demand.
The set of strategies available to the underwriters are: {lower offer price, hold, increase offer
price, increase marketing effort}, Type S’s form their conjecture concerning type L’s demand based
on both noise and indicators, while Type L forms expectations of type Ss’ conjectures. Also, recall
that there are two market segments for the IPOs: the large IPO market where both Type L and Type
S participate, and the small IPO market where only some Type S participate.
To highlight the dominant strategy for each market segment, we start first with the simple case
of only one large issue to be underwritten by the investment bank. Type L is now allowed to trade in
Time 1, i.e., flipping. Let us examine each of the underwriter’s strategies, and their resulting effects on
L’s and S’s demand for shares, offering price, etc.
Reduce offer price. Type L would normally subscribe new shares as long as the price is lowered
enough to cause Equation (3) to be satisfied. However, Type S would use the lowering of the offer
price as an indicator of weak demand and may cause the post offer price to be even lower. Type L
realizing that they could suffer a loss at time 1, may decide not to take up their allocations. Thus,
allowing small investors to make conjectures about an offer’s demand based on indicators may cause
some underpriced IPOs not to be subscribed by the large investors, and fail. However, the story is far
from over. A reduction in the shares taken up by the L type may cause Type S investors to conjecture
why the L type under-subscribed their normal allocations. Each S type may not know L type's total
demand, but they know L’s take up from the ease the underwriters can fill the S type’s own request
for allocation. This is the situation described by Rock (1986) in his model. Thus, there is a positive
probability that L type may again face post offer losses.
Hold offer price. Although this strategy is informationally neutral to the S type at first glance, the
L type will not subscribe their allocations, as the offer price violates Equation (3), i.e., they would not
rationally overpay. Thus, we find that, by introducing type S’s conjecture to depend on indicators,
both price decrease and no change may not be equilibrium strategies anymore, as they are to be
avoided by the L type.
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Increase offer price. Here, independent of type L’s own demand or valuation based on research
and issuer’s fundamentals, as long as L type is aware of how S type investors make their conjectures,
they know an offer price increase will cause the type S to infer high demand, even if initial expected
demand was weak. To show that this is an equilibrium solution, we need to show that L type will take
up their subscriptions, and the underwriter would choose to increase the offer price.
For the first part, if Type L is allowed to trade at Time 1, their optimizing condition is no
longer Equation (3), which is based on fundamental value, but on a looser condition:
𝐿

𝐸 [𝑉 (1, 𝑆)] > 𝑉(0, +).

(6)

E[V(1, L/S)] is the L’s expectation of S’s conjecture, that is a function of V(0, +), an offer price
increase (+) at time 0. Equation (6) defines the condition and profit from flipping to L. Note that
depending on E[V(…)], the long term rationality condition (3) need not be satisfied. In other words,
with flipping, only short-term rationality condition (6) needs to be satisfied. Thus, there are situations,
i.e., if (6) is satisfied, that L type will take up their allocations. Now, if the underwriter sees that L type
will subscribe, in spite of apparent overpricing and low demand, they certainly would want to follow
this strategy of raising the offer price. It makes sense in comparison to the other two strategies, as the
underwriter can expect lower underwriting risks, and to please their issuer clients as well. Thus, an
increase in offer price, under the condition that type S investors use indicators for L’s aggregate
demand, could be the dominant strategy.
Now for the small IPO market, the underwriter needs only be concerned with the conjectures
made by the S type. Recall that S type investors form their conjecture about an issue’s demand based
on both noise and indicators. For small IPOs, given that L type investors do not participate, S type
would have to rely more on noise/rumors. Since underwriters can, under the rubric of marketing
expense – to send out noise and rumors as allegedly favorable information, they would see such
expenses as the dominant strategy. Other strategy such as price decrease could cause S type to
conjecture that the underwriter is revealing a low excess demand situation. Thus, the after-offer market
of a price decrease is expected to be low (versus a prediction of larger price increase in the after-offer
market for heavily marketed shares.)
Next, we shall relax the assumption that underwriters will underwrite only one large IPO issue.
Allowing underwriters to underwrite several issues means both types of investors may examine the
track record of each underwriter, i.e., there is a reputation effect. It stands to reason that an underwriter
that consistently pursues an over pricing strategy (price increase in large IPOs, and marketing in small
IPOs) may allow even the unsophisticated opportunity for learning over time, and cause them to exit
the market, i.e., given enough time they will eventually find out that only overpriced shares are sold.
However, S type, by definition, are not sophisticated, and learn slowly. Some S type may exit the
market and new ones may enter, i.e., the ’There is a new sucker born every minute syndrome.
Furthermore, some S type do make money some of the time, as flippers on small IPOs, and on hard
to price and consequently, underpriced shares in large IPOs. Thus, the dominant strategy outlined
above need not be discarded even in a multi-period reputational world. With the above characteristics
for S type, what is needed is to introduce some noise to defeat the slow learning by the S type in both
markets. In other words, the optimal strategy need only be modified from a simple fixed strategy of
{increase offer price} in large IPOs, and {increase marketing effort} in small IPO market, to a mixed
strategy of {increase, hold, decrease offer price}, and {increase marketing, hold, decrease offer price},
i.e., mixing the use of these strategies from case to case. The mixing of strategies would present to the
S type, who has limited capacity to learn in the first place, a large array of previous observations or
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experiences. These are: under demanded issues that were reduced in price in which they have done
well, under demanded issues that were increased in price, under demanded issues that have no change
in offer price but with more intense marketing pressures, resulting in large first day price gains, over
demanded issues that were increased in offer price, etc. These predictions are consistent with empirical
results of observing all these cases in instances of weak perceived demand.
III. Sample Selection and Characteristics
We gather our initial sample from Thomson Reuters SDC New Issues database to empirically
test the Impresario and Push hypotheses described and modeled in Sections 2.2 through 2.4.
Specifically, we compile a sample of firmly underwritten IPOs completed between 1981 and 2017,
which we split into pre- and post-bubble periods (1981-1996, 1997-2017). We apply sample filters
consistent with the IPO literature, excluding blank check offerings, closed end funds, unit offers,
offers priced below $5, and dual class firms. In addition, we require nonmissing values for the
reallowance fee, selling concession, initial price range, and offer proceeds, as well as the initial and
one-year post-IPO returns (obtained from CRSP), which we describe below.
Tables 1 and 2 report the descriptive statistics and performance measures for the pre and post
IPO bubble samples when divided into five portfolios based upon offer size to control for economies
of scale in underwriter fees. As such, from this point forward in this analysis, size quintile portfolios
are employed when conducting univariate tests. The second column of Tables 1 and 2 report the initial
returns for the portfolios. The average initial return is defined as:
𝐼𝑅𝑞 =

𝑃𝑖
∑𝑛
)
𝑖=1 log (
𝑃𝑖0

𝑛𝑎

,

(7)

where IRq is the average mispricing of portfolio q, Pi is the closing price (or the mean of the bid and
ask price for NASDAQ stocks) for firm i on the first day of trading, Pi0 is the offering price of firm i,
and n is the number of firms in portfolio q.
The average initial return for each of the quintiles is generally consistent with the previous
literature, which finds that smaller IPOs have greater mispricing (e.g., Ibbotson and Ritter (1995)).
Although this initial mispricing varies from over 33% for the smallest quintile to approximately 6%
for the other quintiles, all five of the portfolio initial returns are significantly different from zero
beyond all conventional levels of significance. Note that the final column reports that the sizes of
these IPOs differ quite significantly. The smallest quintile averages $5.11 million whereas the largest
quintile averages nearly $109 million. Columns three and four of Tables 1 and 2 report the one and
three-year holding period abnormal returns for each quintile. This long-run abnormal return (ARiT)
for firm i for T months (i.e., 12 or 36 months) is defined as:
𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑇 = ∏𝑇𝑡=1(1 + 𝑅𝑖,𝑡 ) − ∏𝑇𝑡=1(1 + 𝑅𝑏,𝑡 )

(8)

for t = 1, 2, ..., T where T is the series of months in the holding period, Ri,t is the return for stock i in
month t, and Rb,t is the return of the corresponding size and book-to-market equity reference portfolio
formed at the beginning of the IPO month. Similar to Lyon, Barber, and Tsai (1999), reference
portfolios are constructed from the intersection of (i) 14 size (i.e., book value of equity) groups formed
from NYSE decile breakpoints with the smallest decile group split further into quintiles deciles, and
(ii) book-to-market equity quintiles.
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Table 1 reveals that the smallest quintile has the greatest negative one year (mean = -5.75%, p
= 0.0674) and three year (mean = -16.25%, p = 0.0086) long-run performance, consistent with Brav
and Gompers (1997). Further analysis of the long-run returns is deferred to later sections when
portfolios are formed based upon selling effort and price adjustments. Tables 1 and 2 also reveal
economies of scale in all three measures of selling effort. This result is an extension of the Lee, et al.
(1996) finding for IPO gross spreads.
The next to final column of Tables 1 and 2 report the pre-offer price adjustments for the
IPOs. We measure the price adjustment as:
𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 𝐴𝑑𝑗𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 =

(𝑂𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑟 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒−𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒)
𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒

(9)

where Offer Price is the actual offer price per share at the effective date and Expected Price is the
average of the Initial High File Price and Initial Low File Price. The results in Tables 1 and 2 indicate
that pre-offer price adjustments seem to be dependent on the size of the offer. That is, the smaller
issues tend to decrease their offer price, whereas larger issues tend to increase their offer price. This
finding is new and extends the work of Hanley (1993), Dunbar (1998), and Chang, Chiang, Qian, and
Ritter, (2017).
An average increase in the offer price for large issues is consistent with the impresario
hypothesis of Shiller (1990). Shiller argues that IPOs are purposely underpriced by investment banks
to create the appearance of an excess demand. The rest of the predictions for this hypothesis are to
be presented below.
IV. IPO Selling Efforts
It has been argued that the selling efforts of underwriters can significantly impact the success
of an IPO. For example, when Ritter (1998) addresses the question of why issuers allow considerable
money to be left on the table due to underpricing, he concludes, "... the investment banker will always
be willing to argue that the price jump was due to a successful job of marketing the issue by the
investment banker."
To empirically analyze whether this type of argument is valid, we form three additional
portfolios within each size quintile. These portfolios are based upon the reallowance fee paid by the
issuer to float the IPO. Table 3 reports the results of the fifteen portfolios. The first item of concern
deals with the relationship between the selling effort and the initial return for each portfolio.
Ritter's assertion above seems plausible for the smallest two quintiles. The quintiles represent
the smaller issues that are dominated by individual investors. It is hypothesized that these investors
are the ones to be most persuaded by brokers and dealers as they attempt to push the issue into the
marketplace. This type of selling effort can be thought of as the unsolicited phone calls from brokers
who provide a "hot tip" on a new IPO. By definition, this type of selling strategy works less (if at all)
on sophisticated investors. Table 3 provides empirical support for the Push hypothesis. The results
indicate that the higher reallowance portfolios within quintiles 1 and 2 (i.e., smallest issues) experience
the highest initial first day return (43.8% and 10.1% respectively).
If the clientele effect is significant, we expect the larger issues not to display a positive
relationship between the IPO initial return and the level of reallowance. The largest two quintiles
indicate that there is actually a negative relationship between the degree of underpricing and the level
of reallowance. In the larger issues, a relatively large reallowance is indicative of a shift in marketing
strategy from institutional to retail investors. It follows that those large issues that have a high
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reallowance (i.e., those that must shift more heavily into the retail market) are those with weaker
demands. Thus, the monotonic decrease of initial returns for Quintiles 4 and 5 may be due to this
shifting in clientele.
Another implication of an effective selling effort to retail investors is that along with the high
initial returns, the associated small IPOs will experience poor long-run returns. Quintile one reveals
that those IPOs that are pushed into the marketplace with a high reallowance effort perform almost
three times below the medium reallowance portfolio and over 10 times below the low reallowance
group. This finding indicates that brokers and sellers realize which issues are not as strong and as such,
choose to increase selling effort on these IPOs. The aggregate effect is a temporary surge in demand
as evidenced by the strong initial mispricing, followed by poor long-run performance.
Consistent with the prediction in Shiller’s Impresario hypothesis, the largest issues also display
the pattern that the firms with the greatest underpricing perform the worst in the long run. If
investment bankers do indeed file the initial price low in an attempt to create a strong demand
schedule, then it follows that these same firms may increase the offer price prior to the effective date
in order to benefit further from this hyped-demand. The final column of Table 3 confirms this
assertion. The largest firms in Quintile 5 display a positive relationship between the initial return of
the IPO and the ex-ante effective date price adjustment, and subsequent large offsetting losses. These
findings provide empirical support for Shiller's impresario hypothesis.
V. IPO Offer Price Changes as a Marketing Technique
Hanley (1993) documents that the adjustment of offer prices prior to the effective date does
impact the initial returns of IPOs. Dunbar (1998) builds on the study of Hanley and documents that
under certain conditions, the price adjustments also impact the long-run performance of IPOs. To
further investigate the role of price adjustments on the initial and long-run performance of IPOs, in
this section we create fifteen portfolios based upon size and ex ante price adjustment.
Table 4 reports the market performance for these fifteen portfolios. The Impresario
hypothesis predicts that large issues that increase the offer price will experience the greatest
underpricing. The largest two quintiles arguably contain greater sophisticated money than the smaller
two quintiles. The initial return patterns in the largest two quintiles support the Impresario
explanation. In both quintiles, the greater the level of price adjustment, the greater the degree of
underpricing. Consistent with P2, this positive relationship is not as clear in Quintile 2 (very few
institutional investors) and is not present in Quintile 1 (virtually no institutional investors).
Considering the long-run performance of the various portfolios also reveals some new
evidence of the relationship between ex ante price adjustment, initial returns, and long-run returns.
Consistent with our predictions, Table 4 reports that for the largest quintile (i.e., the one with a
dominance of institutional investors) the high price adjustment firms experience negative three-year
performance. Also consistent with our theory, the low-price adjustment firms experience no
underpricing and positive three-year abnormal returns (i.e., initial return = 0.49%, 1-year return =
8.10%, and 3-year return = 12.85%).
These results parallel those of the smallest quintile for the reallowance effects and suggest that
investment bankers use different strategies to the same end depending on the clientele they are
servicing. Specifically, for the smallest quintile, investment bankers rely on greater broker/dealer
selling effort which results in greater initial returns and worse long-run performance. For the largest
quintiles, investment bankers rely on price changes which achieve the same end (i.e., creating a large
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demand, as evidenced by the high initial jump, for inferior IPOs, as evidenced by the poor long-run
performance).
Finally, the last column of Table 4 also suggests an inverse relationship between price
adjustment and reallowance. That is, investment bankers tend to lower the price and increase the retail
selling effort simultaneously. In the next section, we further analyze the impact of selling effort and
price adjustments.
VI. Multivariate Empirical Tests of Initial and Long-run Returns
The previous sections all discuss univariate analyses of the data. In this section, regression
models are estimated in order to analyze the empirical predictions in a multivariate setting. Two
subsamples are employed in these tests — a portfolio consisting of the smallest quintile and a portfolio
consisting of the two largest quintiles. The regression models are estimated in four separate iterations,
two for initial returns and two for the three-year horizon returns.
A. Pre-IPO Bubble Initial Return OLS Models
The first model estimated for each portfolio is:
𝐼𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑠𝑠 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑐𝑒𝑒𝑑𝑠 + 𝛽2 𝑅𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝐹𝑒𝑒 +
𝛽3 𝑂𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑟 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒 + 𝛽4 𝑉𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦 +
𝛽5 𝑈𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑒𝑟 𝑅𝑒𝑝𝑢𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 + ε

(10)

where:
Initial Return is as defined in Equation (7), Gross Proceeds is the gross proceeds raised in the IPO,
Reallowance Fee is the ratio of reallowance to selling commission, Offer Price change is as defined in
Equation (9), Venture Capital Dummy equals one when the IPO is venture capital backed and zero
otherwise (Chemmanur, Loutskina, and Tian, 2014.), and Underwriter Reputation is the dollar volume
of IPOs the lead investment bank managed during the sample period (Bajo, Chemmanur, Simonyan,
and Tehranian, 2016).
Table 5 reports the results of the model in Equation (10) for the smallest quintile portfolio.
The first column contains the independent variable and the second column contains the predicted
sign of the estimated coefficient. Gross proceeds is a control variable designed to remove size effects
from the variables of interest. For the smallest issues, it is predicted to have a negative coefficient
based on an information asymmetry argument (Boone, Floros, and Johnson, 2016.). Specifically, the
smaller issues are less transparent (and as such inherently riskier) resulting in greater underpricing.
Table 5 provides evidence for this prediction with a negative coefficient that is significantly different
than zero.
The final column of Table 5 reports the estimated elasticity for the gross proceeds variable
from the first model. This measure is constructed by multiplying the estimated coefficient of gross
proceeds by the ratio of the mean of gross proceeds and the mean of the initial return. In general:
∂Y

𝑀𝑒𝑎𝑛 𝑜𝑓 𝑋

𝐸𝑙𝑎𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑜𝑓 𝑋 𝑜𝑛 𝑌 = 𝜕𝑋 ∗ 𝑀𝑒𝑎𝑛 𝑜𝑓 𝑌

(11)

where the first ratio represents the partial derivative of Y based upon a change in X. The interpretation
for this measure is that for each one percentage change in X, Y changes by the elasticity measure. In
the case of gross proceeds, for every one percentage increase in the gross proceeds, the initial return
is decreased 1.35 percent.
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The reallowance fee is predicted to be positively related to the degree of underpricing based
upon the argument that in general the extra selling effort creates a strong initial demand for the IPO.
The estimated coefficient for reallowance is positively significant (p = 0.0041) and the elasticity is 0.68.
This indicates that the selling effort of brokers and dealers is significant in increasing the initial returns
of IPOs for small issues (consistent with P3).
Based upon the marketing arguments discussed earlier in this paper, small issues are predicted
not to be significantly affected by offer price changes (as they generally are not known by the small
issue clientele). Table 5 reports that the coefficient on the offer price change variable is negative and
not significantly different than zero. This finding is consistent with the marketing argument.
As a control variable, a venture-backed dummy is included to capture any venture capital
effects. It is predicted that IPOs that are backed by venture capital will have a lower degree of
underpricing due to the certification role of venture capitalists (Megginson and Weiss (1991)).
Contrary to this prediction, the coefficient is positive and significantly different than zero.
The final term in the first model is a proxy for the underwriter reputation of the lead (i.e.,
book) investment bank. This variable is predicted to be negative based upon the certification role of
prestigious underwriters (Booth and Smith (1986), Chemmanur and Fulghieri (1994) and Dunbar
(1999)). The estimated coefficient for underwriter reputation is consistent with this prediction;
however, it is not significantly different from zero.
Table 6 reports the results of the model in Equation (10) for the largest two quintile portfolios.
Gross proceeds is predicted to be negatively related with the degree of underpricing based upon the
notion that larger issues are associated more with a sophisticated clientele. Because this clientele has
acquired costly information pertaining to the value of the IPO, the asymmetric information problem
is reduced and it is predicted that the larger issues will be less severely underpriced. Table 6 provides
evidence consistent with this prediction with a negative estimated coefficient, however it is not
significantly different from zero.
In larger issues, a high reallowance fee is indicative of a shift from institutional to retail
investors. It follows that investment banks initiate this shift when the estimated demand schedule for
the IPO is weak. As such, we predict that the reallowance fee will have a negative coefficient in these
larger issue regressions (i.e., the opposite prediction than for the small issues). Consistent with this
logic, Table 6 reports that the coefficient for the reallowance variable is negative and significant
beyond all conventional levels of significance. Additionally, the effect is notable based upon the
elasticity measure of -1.76.
The coefficient on the offer price change variable is significantly different from zero beyond
the one percent level as predicted by the argument that increasing the ex-ante offer price increases
demand. As such, this strong demand drives the first day price high, exhibited by larger underpricing.
It is notable that this finding is consistent with the clientele argument of marketing. Recall that this
variable is not significant in the small quintile regressions, yet it is highly significant for the larger
issues.
The final two control variables, venture backed and underwriter reputation are predicted to be
negatively related with the first day initial returns. As in the small quintile, the venture backed issues
tend to have greater initial first-day returns and underwriter reputation has a negative coefficient.
Overall, the initial return regressions indicate that marketing effort does matter in the
underpricing of IPOs. Specifically, reallowance fees are directly associated with initial returns in small
issues and indirectly related to initial returns in large issues. Additionally, offer price adjustments are
directly related with initial returns for large issues and not significantly correlated with initial returns
for small issues.
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B. Three-year Horizon OLS Models
The results from the long-run OLS tests are reported in Tables 7 and 8. For the small issues,
the reallowance variable is predicted to be negatively related with long-run performance based upon
the idea that IPOs that must be pushed into the market are inferior on average. Table 7 confirms the
negative correlation; however, the coefficient is not significantly different than zero. Although not
statistically significant, the reallowance fee has an elasticity of nearly -4.
For the small issues, the offer price change variable is predicted not to impact the long-run
returns. The coefficient is positive and non-significant. The predictions for each of the control
variables are the same for Tables 7 and 8. The coefficient on gross proceeds is unclear. Relying on the
small firm effect, it is predicted to be negative. Specifically, small firms tend to outperform large firms
on average (e.g., Fama and French (1992)). Based upon the findings of Brav and Gompers (1997) it is
predicted to be positive. Finally, if the partition by size into portfolios has removed the majority of
size effects, it is predicted to be non-significant.
The venture-backed dummy is designed to capture the effect of venture capital influence on
the IPO. Megginson and Weiss (1991) and Brav and Gompers (1997) show that IPOs that are backed
by venture capital outperform those IPOs that are not. Due to this certification process, we predict
that the venture-backed dummy coefficient has a positive relationship with the long-run returns.
The final variable in the regressions is a proxy for the underwriter reputation of the lead
underwriter. Carter, Dark and Singh (1998) show that issues underwritten by prestigious underwriters
perform better than those that are not. It follows that this certification process of prestigious
underwriters will be demonstrated by a positive coefficient on the underwriter reputation variable.
Table 7 reports that for the smallest quintile none of the control variables are significant;
however, by including them in the regression their confounding effects are removed from the two
variables of interest.
Table 8 reports the results for the largest two quintiles. The variable of greatest interest in this
regression is offer price change. It is predicted to be negatively related with the long-run return based
upon the marketing strategy presented earlier in this paper. That is, investment bankers are able to sell
inferior issues at greater prices by purposely setting the offer price low and then increasing it once the
demand is great. Over the long-term, these issues are predicted to underperform with the retail
investors bearing the losses. Consistent with this logic, the coefficient on the offer price change
variable is negative and significant beyond the one percent level.
Taken together, the three-year horizon regressions provide evidence that the selling effort as
measured by the reallowance fee impacts the long-run performance of small IPOs and the price change
impacts the long-run performance of large IPOs. Specifically, the high reallowance fee elasticity
indicates that long-run small issue performance is especially sensitive to changes in the selling effort.
Also consistent with earlier arguments, ex ante price adjustments are shown to significantly impact the
long-run performance of large IPOs.
C. Post-IPO Bubble Sample (1997-2017)
The post-IPO bubble reveals interesting results and document the shifts in the selling of IPOs.
Tables 9 and 10 evaluate the empirical performance of the theoretical model from 1997 to 2017. We
find empirical evidence suggesting that the push hypothesis is not supported during this latter time
period, however we find empirical support for the impresario hypothesis. In Table 9, we document
that the quantitative results found in the pre-IPO bubble are not robust to new investor behavior and
the push hypothesis in our model no longer appears to be supported in the sample tested. However,
in Table 10 we document that the impresario hypothesis still appears as a relevant factor. Multivariate
analysis (not tabulated but available upon request) provide qualitatively similar findings.
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One explanation is the reduced importance of retail investors in IPO allocations in recent
years. Although deal-level allocation data is not available on a widespread basis, the typical allocation
to institutions has increased over time from roughly 66% in the mid-1980s (Hanley and Wilhelm,
1995) to upward of 90% more recently.1 In addition, Robinhood’s IPO in 2021 was deemed unusual
for planning a retail allocation of shares of up to 35%.2 Increasing institutional allocations suggest that
retail (i.e., non-sophisticated) investors play a smaller role in the current IPO market for primary
shares, explaining why pushing shares to retail investors might cease to be a widespread strategy. In
contrast, we find continued evidence for the Impresario Hypothesis in more recent years, which
involves initial allocations to institutions and other sophisticated investors, consistent with recent
allocation trends. The evidence we provide suggesting a shift in IPO selling strategies in recent years
may be a rich field for further research.
Furthermore, recent developments indicate that IPO selling strategies might be shifting yet
again. For example, retail brokerages such as Robinhood and SoFi have recently introduced
mechanisms to allocate IPO shares to small retail investors.3 Whereas early allocations have been small
(< 3% of shares offered), these new programs offer a potentially new channel to provide/push IPO
shares to non-sophisticated investors.
VII. Summary and Conclusion
The purpose of this paper is to demonstrate the importance of the marketing effort of IPOs.
As such, we have examined the reallowance fee that is used to remunerate brokers and dealers for
their selling efforts as well as ex ante offer price adjustments. The results indicate that investment
banks use both of these mechanisms successfully; however, their use depends upon the investment
clientele.
Before the IPO bubble, retail investors, especially those who invest in very small IPOs, seem
to respond to the selling efforts of brokers and dealers. The empirical results indicate that IPOs that
must be pushed into the market (to these retail investors) have a greater initial return than those that
are not pushed. It is argued that this greater initial return is the result of an increased demand created
by an intense selling effort. These same IPOs that experience a large initial surge also perform the
worst over the long-term (i.e., one- and three-year horizons). Thus, dealers and sellers are able to
create a demand for inferior IPOs through their selling efforts to retail clients as evidenced by these
empirical findings.
Institutional investors on the other hand do not respond as strongly to the selling efforts of
dealers and brokers. By manipulating the pre-offer price, investment bankers are able to increase the
demand for IPOs. Specifically, investment bankers tend to systematically underprice large IPOs in the
initial prospectus and then subsequently adjust the price upward. This subsequent increase in the offer
price sends a positive signal to the market and as such creates an even greater demand for the IPO.
These large issues that increase the pre-offer price subsequently perform worse than large issues that
do not increase the ex-ante offer price. Following the IPO bubble, the Impresario Hypothesis is
empirically supported, indicating a shift in selling mechanisms post-bubble.

1

https://www.fidelity.com/learning-center/trading-investing/trading/ipo-share-allocation-process.
https://www.ft.com/content/ee755c02-dd09-4041-8b14-efad30a662a6.
3
See https://robinhood.com/us/en/support/articles/ipo-access/ and https://www.sofi.com/invest/ipo-investing/.
2
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Table 1
Panel A: Pre-IPO Bubble Descriptive Statistics for Quintile Size Groups
Descriptive statistics for 3,403 firmly underwritten IPOs that occurred between 1981 and 1996. The initial return is
calculated as the natural logarithm of the ratio of the closing first day price to the offer price. One and three-year Abn.
Rtn. are the abnormal returns over one and three years defined as the holding period return of the IPO adjusted by the
return on a matching benchmark firm based on size and market to book ratio. Reallowance fee (Selling concession)/Gross
proceeds is the percentage proportion of the reallowance (selling concession) to the gross proceeds. The
reallowance/selling concession is the portion of the reallowance fee within the selling concession. Price adjustment is the
percentage change between the initial filing expected offer price and the final offer price. Gross proceeds is the amount
of dollars in millions raised by the IPO.

Size Quintile

Initial
Return

1 Year
Abn. Rtn.

3 Year
Abn. Rtn.

Reallowance
to Proceeds

Concession
to Proceeds

Reallowance
to Concession

Price
Adjustment

Gross
Proceeds

Q1 (Smallest)
P-value
Sample Size
Median

33.80%
0.0001
681
22.00%

-5.75%
0.0674
681
-11.18%

-16.25%
0.0086
438
-29.25%

2.04%
0.0001
681
1.91%

4.80%
0.0001
681
4.75%

42.06%
0.0001
681
40.00%

-4.47%
0.0001
680
0.00%

$5.11 Mil
0.0001
681
$5.20 Mil

Q2
P-value
Sample Size
Median

5.89%
0.0001
680
3.51%

-0.22%
0.9413
680
-4.38%

24.77%
0.0037
453
9.19%

1.34%
0.0001
679
1.25%

4.11%
0.0001
679
4.00%

32.70%
0.0001
679
30.30%

-9.45%
0.001
680
-8.33%

$12.68 Mil
0.0001
680
$12.80 Mil

Q3
P-value
Sample Size
Median

5.84%
0.0001
680
4.75%

1.25%
0.695
680
-4.43%

17.57%
0.0331
471
-7.34%

1.02%
0.0001
680
0.97%

3.99%
0.0001
680
4.00%

25.62%
0.0001
680
23.81%

-3.41%
0.0001
680
0.00%

$22.09 Mil
0.0001
680
$22.00 Mil

Q4
P-value
Sample Size
Median

9.64%
0.0001
682
9.18%

6.62%
0.0417
682
0.63%

11.94%
0.0963
457
-15.15%

0.84%
0.0001
682
0.77%

4.01%
0.0001
682
4.00%

20.94%
0.0001
682
19.23%

5.54%
0.0001
682
4.54%

$36.18 Mil
0.0001
682
$35.5 Mil

Q5 (Largest)
P-value
Sample Size
Median

6.41%
0.0001
680
4.99%

2.41%
0.3023
680
1.26%

0.17%
0.9761
506
-0.49%

0.66%
0.0001
680
0.61%

3.78%
0.0001
680
3.9%

17.74%
0.0001
680
15.9%

4.33%
0.0001
680
3.45%

$108.96 Mil
0.0001
680
$78.00 Mil
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Table 2
Panel B: Post-IPO Bubble Descriptive Statistics for Quintile Size Groups
Descriptive statistics for 2,006 firmly underwritten IPOs that occurred between 1997 and 2017. The initial return is the
percentage change from the offer price to the first-day closing price. One and three-year Abn. Rtn. are the abnormal
returns over one and three years defined as the holding period return of the IPO adjusted by the return on a matching
benchmark firm based on market capitalization (size) and book-to-market equity ratio. Reallowance fee (Selling
concession)/Gross proceeds is the percentage proportion of the reallowance (selling concession) to the gross proceeds.
The reallowance/selling concession is the portion of the reallowance fee within the selling concession. Price adjustment is
the percentage change between the initial filing expected offer price and the final offer price. Gross proceeds is the amount
– in millions of 2020 dollars – raised by the IPO, adjusted for inflation using the quarterly GDP deflator.

Size Quintile

Initial
Return

1 Year
Abn. Rtn.

3 Year
Abn. Rtn.

Reallowance
to Proceeds

Concession
to Proceeds

Reallowance
to Concession

Price
Adjustment

Gross
Proceeds

Q1 (Smallest)
P-value
Sample Size
Median

10.46%
0.0001
401
3.13%

-7.89%
0.051
401
-26.03%

-14.88%
0.0701
398
-56.64%

1.20%
0.0001
401
1.11%

4.03%
0.0001
401
4.00%

30.11%
0.0001
401
28.57%

-13.47%
0.0001
401
-13.33%

$31.77 Mil
0.0001
401
$33.23 Mil

Q2
P-value
Sample Size
Median

26.56%
0.0001
401
13.33%

-10.57%
0.0214
401
-25.63%

-28.60%
0.0031
398
-73.35%

0.92%
0.0001
401
0.83%

4.09%
0.0001
401
4.17%

22.57%
0.0001
401
21.28%

-2.86%
0.0130
401
0.00%

$60.48 Mil
0.0001
401
$60.12 Mil

Q3
P-value
Sample Size
Median

37.92%
0.0001
402
16.58%

-12.75%
0.0038
402
-27.23%

-36.28%
0.0001
397
-71.64%

0.77%
0.0001
402
0.71%

4.11%
0.0001
402
4.18%

18.83%
0.0001
402
18.18%

7.37%
0.0001
402
6.25%

$91.13 Mil
0.0001
402
$90.78 Mil

Q4
P-value
Sample Size
Median

46.47%
0.0001
401
18.00%

-21.73%
0.0001
401
-29.62%

-43.90%
0.0001
399
-63.96%

0.67%
0.0001
401
0.67%

4.09%
0.0001
401
4.19%

16.60%
0.0001
401
15.87%

12.56%
0.0001
401
6.67%

$142.74 Mil
0.0001
401
$137.76 Mil

Q5 (Largest)
P-value
Sample Size
Median

24.55%
0.0001
401
6.89%

-8.64%
0.0075
401
-9.86%

-22.73%
0.0001
401
-39.16%

0.60%
0.0001
401
0.56%

3.76%
0.0001
401
3.90%

16.11%
0.0001
401
14.93%

6.33%
0.0001
401
0.00%

$516.11 Mil
0.0001
401
$307.20 Mil

Published by Pepperdine Digital Commons, 2022

Brau and Henry: An Analysis of Selling Concessions

The Journal of Entrepreneurial Finance, Vol. 24, Iss. 4 [2022], Art. 2

39

Table 3
Reallowance to Selling Concession Quintile Size Groups Pre-Bubble
Portfolios of IPOs occurring between 1981 and 1996 based upon the reallowance fee. The
reallowance/concession is the portion of the reallowance fee within the selling concession. The initial return is
calculated as the natural logarithm of the ratio of the closing first day price to the offer price. One and threeyear Abn. Rtn. are the abnormal returns over one and three years defined as the holding period return of the
IPO adjusted by the return on a matching benchmark firm based on size and market to book ratio. Price
adjustment is the percentage change between the initial filing expected offer price and the final offer price. a, b,
and c indicate the value is statistically different from zero at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively.
Sample
Size

Initial
Return

1 Year
Abn. Rtn.

3 Year
Abn. Rtn.

Price
Adjustment

Low Reallowance/Concession

259

31.59%a

-7.37%

-3.28%

-4.12%

Medium Reallow/Concession

175

23.40%a

2.61%

-12.10%

-6.56%

High Reallowance/Concession

247

43.80%a

-9.99%

-33.29%a

-3.48%

Low Reallowance/Concession

226

4.02%c

-3.87%

14.03%

-3.75%

Medium Reallow/Concession

224

4.75%a

3.96%

43.02%b

-11.47%

High Reallowance/Concession

229

10.12%a

-0.63%

16.90%

-13.13%

Low Reallowance/Concession

218

5.78%a

6.75

32.32%b

4.87

Medium Reallow/Concession

234

8.51%a

-0.68

18.43%

-4.06

High Reallowance/Concession

228

3.15%c

-2.03

0.41%

-10.66

Low Reallowance/Concession

229

16.58%a

10.20%c

13.36%

15.87%

Medium Reallow/Concession

221

11.00%a

-2.30%

2.75%

5.32%

High Reallowance/Concession

232

1.49%

11.57%c

20.29%

-4.44%

Low Reallowance/Concession

209

10.11%a

-2.05%

-0.72%

11.37%

Medium Reallow/Concession

241

9.75%a

4.40%

-16.24%c

6.81%

High Reallowance/Concession

230

-0.45%

4.83%

17.25%c

-4.67%

Sample
Panel A. Quintile 1 (Smallest)

Panel B. Quintile 2

Panel C. Quintile 3

Panel D. Quintile 4

Panel E. Quintile 5 (Largest)
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Table 4
Percentage Price Change Prior to Offer Quintile Size Groups Pre-Bubble
Portfolios of IPOs occurring between 1981 and 1996 based upon price adjustment. Price adjustment is the
percentage change between the initial filing expected offer price and the final offer price. (Generally, low (high)
price adjustments indicate offer price decreases (increases) and the medium price adjustment contains those
issues with little or no change.) The initial return is calculated as the natural logarithm of the ratio of the closing
first day price to the offer price. One and three-year Abn. Rtn, is the abnormal return over one and three years
defined as the holding period return of the IPO adjusted by the return on a matching benchmark firm based
on size and market to book ratio. The reallow/concess is the portion of the reallowance fee within the selling
concession. a, b, and c indicate the value is statistically different from zero at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels.
Sample
Size

Initial
Return

1 Year
Abn. Rtn.

3 Year
Abn. Rtn.

Reallow/
Concess

Low Price Adjustment

227

23.20%a

-8.56%c

-14.73%

40.31%

Medium Price Adjustment

365

45.57%a

-4.75%

-17.91%b

44.56%

High Price Adjustment

88

12.39%b

-4.18%

-17.11%

36.27%

Low Price Adjustment

224

6.43%a

7.84%

26.37%b

34.88%

Medium Price Adjustment

201

4.14%c

-8.18%

20.21%

32.38%

High Price Adjustment

255

6.80%a

-1.02%

27.28%b

31.05%

Low Price Adjustment

221

2.54%b

-5.27%

8.06%

28.97%

Medium Price Adjustment

233

5.94%a

-1.08%

4.02%

25.31%

High Price Adjustment

226

8.95%a

10.03%c

38.52%b

22.66%

Low Price Adjustment

212

1.49%

7.48%

37.91%b

23.95%

Medium Price Adjustment

243

5.59%a

2.95%

6.44%

20.48%

High Price Adjustment

227

21.58%a

9.74%c

-2.09%

18.63%

Low Price Adjustment

226

-0.49%

8.10%b

12.85%

20.22%

Medium Price Adjustment

227

5.84%a

6.99%c

7.14%

17.73%

High Price Adjustment

227

13.85%a

-7.83%c

-18.42%c

15.29%

Sample
Panel A. Quintile 1 (Smallest)

Panel B. Quintile 2

Panel C. Quintile 3

Panel D. Quintile 4

Panel E. Quintile 5 (Largest)
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Table 5
OLS Regressions with Initial Return as the Dependent Variable,
Smallest Quintile Pre-Bubble
Ordinary Least Squares regression of the quintile of the smallest IPOs occurring between 1981 and
1996. The model estimated is:
Initial Return =  + 1Gross Proceeds + 2Reallowance Fee + 3Offer Price Change + 4Venture
Capital Dummy + 5Underwriter Reputation + ,
where: Initial Return is calculated as the natural logarithm of the ratio of the closing first day price to
the offer price; Gross Proceeds is the gross proceeds raised in the IPO; Reallowance fee is the ratio
of reallowance to selling commission; Offer price change is the percentage change between the initial
filing expected offer price and the final offer price; Venture capital dummy equals one when the IPO
is venture capital backed and zero otherwise; and Underwriter reputation is the dollar volume of IPOs
the lead investment bank managed during the sample period. The elasticity is defined as the product
of the estimated coefficient and the ratio of the independent variable mean to the dependent variable
mean.

Independent Variable

Empirical
Prediction

Intercept

Parameter
Estimate
(p-value)

Elasticity

0.3596
(0.0041)

Gross proceeds

-

-0.0613
(0.0002)

-1.3503

Reallowance fee

+

0.0041
(0.0149)

0.6815

Offer price change

+

-0.0012
(0.5231)

0.0237

Venture backed

-

0.1154
(0.0233)

Underwriter reputation

-

-1.750
(0.3501)

Sample Size

303

R-square

0.1027

F Value

6.82
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Table 6
OLS Regressions with Initial Return as the Dependent Variable,
Two Largest Quintiles Pre-Bubble
Ordinary Least Squares regression of the two quintiles of the largest IPOs occurring between 1981
and 1996. The model estimated is:
Initial Return =  + 1Gross Proceeds + 2Reallowance Fee + 3Offer Price Change + 4Venture
Capital Dummy + 5Underwriter Reputation + ,
where: Initial Return is calculated as the natural logarithm of the ratio of the closing first day price to
the offer price; Gross Proceeds is the gross proceeds raised in the IPO; Reallowance fee is the ratio
of reallowance to selling commission; Offer price change is the percentage change between the initial
filing expected offer price and the final offer price; Venture capital dummy equals one when the IPO
is venture capital backed and zero otherwise; and Underwriter reputation is the dollar volume of IPOs
the lead investment bank managed during the sample period. The elasticity is defined as the product
of the estimated coefficient and the ratio of the independent variable mean to the dependent variable
mean.

Independent Variable

Empirical
Prediction

Intercept

Parameter
Estimate
(p-value)

Elasticity

0.1879
(0.0001)

Gross proceeds

-

-0.0002
(0.1750)

-0.1958

Reallowance fee

-

-0.0058
(0.0001)

-1.7599

Offer price change

+

0.0025
(0.0001)

0.1777

Venture backed

-

0.0432
(0.0143)

Underwriter reputation

-

-0.321
(0.1607)

Sample Size

1087

R-square

0.0764

F Value

17.892
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Table 7
OLS Regressions with Three Year Abnormal Returns as Dependent Variable,
Smallest Quintile Pre-Bubble
Ordinary Least Squares regression of the quintile of smallest IPOs occurring between 1981 and 1996.
The model estimated is:
Three Year Return =  + 1Gross Proceeds + 2Reallowance Fee + 3Offer Price Change +
4Venture Capital Dummy + 5Underwriter Reputation + ,
where: Three Year Return is the abnormal return over three years and is defined as the holding period
return of the IPO adjusted by the return on a matching benchmark firm based on size and market to
book ratio; Gross Proceeds is the gross proceeds raised in the IPO; Reallowance fee is the ratio of
reallowance to selling commission; Offer price change is the percentage change between the initial
filing expected offer price and the final offer price; Venture capital dummy equals one when the IPO
is venture capital backed and zero otherwise; and Underwriter reputation is the dollar volume of IPOs
the lead investment bank managed during the sample period. The elasticity is defined as the product
of the estimated coefficient and the ratio of the independent variable mean to the dependent variable
mean.

Independent Variable

Empirical
Prediction

Parameter
Estimate
(p-value)

Elasticity

Intercept

0.6569
(0.2376)

Gross proceeds

-0.0575
(0.4213)

-2.7609

-0.0111
(0.1154)

-3.9621

0.0058
(0.4614)

-0.2258

Reallowance fee

-

Offer price change

Venture backed

+

0.0477
(0.8246)

Underwriter reputation

+

-3.482
(0.7278)

Sample Size

194

R-square

0.0183

F Value

0.704
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Table 8
OLS Regressions with Three Year Abnormal Returns as Dependent Variable,
Two Largest Quintiles Pre-Bubble
Ordinary Least Squares regression of the two largest quintiles of IPOs occurring between 1981 and
1996. The model estimated is:
Three Year Return =  + 1Gross Proceeds + 2Reallowance Fee + 3Offer Price Change +
4Venture Capital Dummy + 5Underwriter Reputation + ,
where: Three Year Return is the abnormal return over three years and is defined as the holding period
return of the IPO adjusted by the return on a matching benchmark firm based on size and market to
book ratio; Gross Proceeds is the gross proceeds raised in the IPO; Reallowance fee is the ratio of
reallowance to selling commission; Offer price change is the percentage change between the initial
filing expected offer price and the final offer price; Venture capital dummy equals one when the IPO
is venture capital backed and zero otherwise; and Underwriter reputation is the dollar volume of IPOs
the lead investment bank managed during the sample period. The elasticity is defined as the product
of the estimated coefficient and the ratio of the independent variable mean to the dependent variable
mean.

Independent Variable

Empirical
Prediction

Intercept

Parameter
Estimate
(p-value)
0.0171
(0.9335)

Gross proceeds

-

Reallowance fee

-0.0013
(0.1157)

-1.2630

-0.0001
(0.9879)

-0.0341

-0.7658

Offer price change

-

-0.0093
(0.0004)

Venture backed

+

0.1378
(0.1977)

Underwriter reputation

+

3.392
(0.0149)

Sample Size

763

R-square

0.0277

F Value

4.323
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Table 9
Reallowance to Selling Concession Quintile Size Groups 1997-2017
Portfolios of IPOs occurring between 1997 and 2017 formed on gross proceeds and reallowance fee
(conditional on proceeds). The reallowance/concession is the portion of the reallowance fee within the selling
concession. The initial return is the percentage change from the offer price to the first-day closing price. One
and three-year Abn. Rtn. are the abnormal returns over one and three years defined as the holding period return
of the IPO adjusted by the return on a matching benchmark firm based on market capitalization (size) and
book-to-market equity ratio. Price adjustment is the percentage change between the initial filing expected offer
price and the final offer price. a, b, and c indicate the value is statistically different from zero at the 0.01, 0.05,
and 0.10 levels, respectively.
Sample
Size

Initial
Return

1 Year
Abn. Rtn.

3 Year
Abn. Rtn.

Price
Adjustment

Low Reallowance/Concession

117

14.22%a

-10.67%c

-22.69%c

-0.51%

Medium Reallow/Concession

139

9.87%a

-6.76%

-14.88%

-13.69%a

High Reallowance/Concession

145

8.00%a

-6.73%

-8.48%

-23.73%a

Low Reallowance/Concession

134

39.67%a

12.09%

-31.56%a

10.65%a

Medium Reallow/Concession

145

21.57%a

-25.33%a

-30.82%b

-0.75%

High Reallowance/Concession

122

18.10%a

-17.92%b

-22.65%

-20.20%a

Low Reallowance/Concession

143

64.31%a

-10.46%

-49.13%a

21.05%a

Medium Reallow/Concession

110

34.87%a

-18.07%a

-37.20%a

5.59%a

High Reallowance/Concession

149

14.83%a

-11.01%

-23.20%b

-4.43%a

Low Reallowance/Concession

131

84.95%a

-30.15%a

-53.48%a

30.84%a

Medium Reallow/Concession

138

41.54%a

-19.17%a

-45.97%a

13.10%a

High Reallowance/Concession

132

13.44%a

-16.04%a

-32.17%a

-6.15%a

Low Reallowance/Concession

133

49.17%a

-13.46%b

-28.72%a

21.11%a

Medium Reallow/Concession

133

15.77%a

-14.50%a

-25.29%a

5.82%a

High Reallowance/Concession

135

8.95%a

1.88%

-14.31%c

-7.74%a

Sample
Panel A. Quintile 1 (Smallest)

Panel B. Quintile 2

Panel C. Quintile 3

Panel D. Quintile 4

Panel E. Quintile 5 (Largest)
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Table 10
Percentage Price Change Prior to Offer Quintile Size Groups 1997-2017
Portfolios of IPOs occurring between 1997 and 2017 formed on gross proceeds and price adjustment
(conditional on proceeds). Price adjustment is the percentage change between the initial filing expected offer
price and the final offer price. (Generally, low (high) price adjustments indicate offer price decreases (increases)
and the medium price adjustment contains those issues with little or no change.) The initial return is the
percentage change from the offer price to the first-day closing price. One and three-year Abn. Rtn, is the
abnormal return over one and three years defined as the holding period return of the IPO adjusted by the return
on a matching benchmark firm based on market capitalization (size) and book-to-market equity ratio. The
reallow/concess is the portion of the reallowance fee within the selling concession. a, b, and c indicate the value
is statistically different from zero at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively.
Sample
Size

Initial
Return

1 Year
Abn. Rtn.

3 Year
Abn. Rtn.

Reallow/
Concess

Low Price Adjustment

137

7.35%a

-5.03%

-7.31%

35.08%a

Medium Price Adjustment

130

5.48%a

2.45%

-1.15%

28.62%a

High Price Adjustment

134

18.48%a

-20.84%a

-35.97%a

26.47%a

Low Price Adjustment

134

8.19%a

-18.89%a

-27.89%b

27.63%a

Medium Price Adjustment

130

17.06%a

-16.39%b

-24.32%b

21.03%a

High Price Adjustment

137

53.55%a

3.09%

-33.36%b

19.09%a

Low Price Adjustment

128

4.17%a

1.67%

-18.20%c

21.85%a

Medium Price Adjustment

142

23.64%a

-18.72%a

-40.48%a

18.52%a

High Price Adjustment

132

86.00%a

-20.30%b

-49.09%a

16.24%a

Low Price Adjustment

154

5.62%a

-8.12%c

-21.94%b

19.73%a

Medium Price Adjustment

110

28.15%a

-15.07%b

-46.33%a

15.38%a

High Price Adjustment

137

107.10%a

-42.37%a

-66.83%a

14.06%a

Low Price Adjustment

133

2.18%a

8.66%

-0.34%

19.55%a

Medium Price Adjustment

135

8.88%a

-7.63%c

-27.40%a

15.18%a

High Price Adjustment

133

62.82%a

-26.97%a

-40.39%a

13.61%a

Sample
Panel A. Quintile 1 (Smallest)

Panel B. Quintile 2

Panel C. Quintile 3

Panel D. Quintile 4

Panel E. Quintile 5 (Largest)
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